We the Panel

The field guide

The political compass, explained

For more than two centuries, politics has been pictured as a line from left to right. Here’s where that line came from, why researchers added a second axis, and how well two-axis maps fit politics in different countries.

Updated · 9 min read · By the We the Panel team

Online political quizzes often place you on a grid with two axes rather than a single line. The best known calls itself the Political Compass. The idea behind it is older than the internet, and it starts with where people sat in a room in Versailles.

Where left and right come from

The left-right axis is “generally dated to 1789, when the French National Assembly met in Versailles,” according to Encyclopaedia Britannica. The delegates were divided over how much authority King Louis XVI should keep, and, as History.com tells it, “the anti-royalist revolutionaries seated themselves to the presiding officer’s left, while the more conservative, aristocratic supporters of the monarchy gathered to the right.”

The labels stuck in France and spread, though they weren’t common in English-speaking countries until the early 20th century. What they stand for has kept changing ever since.

The trouble with one line

A single line forces every political idea into “more left” or “more right,” and some combinations don’t fit. The classic example: the line puts communism and fascism at opposite ends, though, as the political scientist and novelist Jerry Pournelle wrote, “those two have many similarities.” It also leaves no obvious place for someone who wants low taxes and few social rules, or for someone who wants a strong safety net and traditional values.

Adding a second axis: a short history

  • Hans Eysenck, 1954. In The Psychology of Politics, the psychologist paired a radicalism-conservatism axis with a second one he called “tough-minded” versus “tender-minded,” meant to capture authoritarianism. As Britannica notes, his model “would classify both” Stalinist communists and Nazis “as extreme examples of ‘tough-mindedness.’” A lecture at Gresham College sums up his point: he “reckoned that there was an equivalent authoritarianism of the left.”
  • Jerry Pournelle, early 1960s. His PhD dissertation at the University of Washington argued “that the old left-right category doesn’t really work.” His two axes were “Attitude toward the State” and “Attitude toward Planned Social Progress,” which he described as “rationalism.”
  • David Nolan, 1971. The Nolan Chart, first published in January 1971, used economic freedom and personal freedom as its axes. Its purpose, Reason magazine recalled, “was to discredit the typical left-to-right political spectrum as leaving no room for the libertarian position.” Nolan co-founded the Libertarian Party the same year. In 1987 the World’s Smallest Political Quiz added ten questions to his chart.
  • The Political Compass, 2001. The website politicalcompass.org, described by The New York Times in 2003 as “a project by Wayne Brittenden, a political journalist in London,” puts economic left and right on one axis and authoritarian versus libertarian on the other. “Our essential point is that Left and Right, although far from obsolete, are essentially a measure of economics,” the site explains.
  • Voting advice apps. Several of the election-time quizzes that match voters with parties draw a map too. Switzerland’s smartvote shows candidates, parties or lists on “a two-dimensional political map” (smartvote). Vote Compass, used in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere, places you in a “multi-axis political space” whose axes typically reflect “attitudes toward economic regulation or social values” (Vox Pop Labs). More on these in Political quizzes compared.

What the research says about Americans

Academic studies of American opinion broadly back the idea that views on the economy and on social questions are separate things.

  • In 1981, Stuart Lilie and William Maddox described four belief systems in American survey data: liberal, conservative, populist and libertarian.
  • A 2006 Pew Research Center analysis found 18% liberals, 15% conservatives, 16% populists and 9% libertarians, plus a large non-ideological group, 42%, it labeled “ambivalents.”
  • Shawn Treier and D. Sunshine Hillygus found in 2009 that “the belief systems of the mass public remain multidimensional, with many in the electorate holding liberal preferences on one dimension and conservative preferences on another.” Some 44% of self-described moderates were cross-pressured in this way.
  • Stanley Feldman and Christopher Johnston concluded in 2014 that “two dimensions—economic and social ideology—are the minimum needed to account for domestic policy preferences.”
  • Lee Drutman’s 2017 study of 2016 voters found 28.9% were “populists,” liberal on economics and conservative on identity issues, and 3.8% the reverse.

There’s a counterpoint. A 2023 study in the American Political Science Review found that a single left-right line describes the policy views of most Americans well, about 73%. But roughly one in five hold views that no single line captures.

So why does politics still sound one-dimensional? Partly because politicians are. Votes in Congress have lined up along a single liberal-conservative dimension through most of American history, according to the Voteview project that scores them. A 2012 study by Edward Carmines and colleagues put it plainly: “while American political elites compete across a single dimension of conflict, the American people organize their policy attitudes around two distinct dimensions, one economic and one social” (The Forum).

Beyond the United States

Research in other countries often finds a similar pair of dimensions. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey asks political scientists to rate Europe’s parties on, among other things, two separate scales; in its 2024 round, 609 of them rated 279 parties in 31 countries (Chapel Hill Expert Survey). One scale is economic: parties on the left “want government to play an active role in the economy,” and those on the right “want a reduced role for government.” The other, which the survey calls GAL–TAN, is cultural. It runs from parties that “favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation” to “traditional” or “authoritarian” parties that “reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition, and stability.”

In a 2006 study of Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, Kriesi and colleagues found that globalization had opened a new divide between “those who benefit from this process” and “those who tend to lose.” In all six countries, that divide had settled into “existing two-dimensional national political spaces” (European Journal of Political Research), which a 2012 book led by Kriesi describes as “an economic and a cultural dimension.” The book cautions that the countries studied “do not represent the whole of Europe”: Scandinavia, southern Europe and eastern Europe were missing (Political Conflict in Western Europe).

Looking at ordinary people’s views across 99 countries, a 2019 study found that a consistent left–right pattern, with economic and cultural views lining up, is uncommon. More often, people who were right-wing on cultural questions leaned left on the economy, or the reverse, “reflecting a contrast between desires for cultural and economic protection vs. freedom” (British Journal of Political Science).

As in the United States, parties often look more one-dimensional than voters. “There are many voters with such ‘left-authoritarian’ views, but few parties,” a 2014 study of Western Europe found (West European Politics): plenty of people are left-wing on the economy and right-wing on cultural questions, but few parties are. In the Netherlands, the Leiden political scientist Simon Otjes pointed out in 2021 that on the Kieskompas, a two-axis voting guide, all the parties lay on a straight line, and 27 of its 30 questions fit that one line perfectly. Voters, he said, are “so diverse that two dimensions are not enough” (Mare, our translation).

Countries that divide differently

Most of the research above comes from Western Europe and North America. Elsewhere, politics can take a different shape.

  • Latin America. A 2023 study comparing party positions found that “in Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension,” while in Europe competition runs “overwhelmingly along two dimensions” (Party Politics).
  • Former communist countries. A 2006 study of 171 parties in 23 European countries found that “basic structures of party competition in the East and West are fundamentally and explicably different” (Comparative Political Studies).
  • Israel. The main divide is left versus right, mixing economic and cultural issues, but parties’ positions on it “are closely related to their positions on policies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Party Politics).
  • India. Using national election surveys from 1996 to 2019, a 2023 study found that “voters cluster around the centre-left position on economic issues.” Differences among politicians don’t carry over to voters, the authors argue, “because all political parties present the State as the solution to economic deprivation” (Studies in Indian Politics). In an earlier book, the same authors describe politics in India as a struggle over “the reach and purpose of the state” and “the place of marginalised groups in society,” as a review in The Caravan put it.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa. A 16-country Afrobarometer study found that appeals based on “what Western observers would call ideology are rare,” and “little evidence” of consistent ideological patterns in people’s survey answers (Afrobarometer). Another 16-country study found that Africans “engage in both ethnic and economic voting” (Commonwealth & Comparative Politics).
  • Belgium and Northern Ireland. Some divides cut across both axes. Belgium’s national parties split along language lines between 1968 and 1978, and by 2003, outside one bilingual district around Brussels, Dutch- and French-speaking parties “no longer compete against each other” (Chatham House). In Northern Ireland, the divide between unionists and nationalists led More in Common to leave it out of a 2025 study that grouped Britons by their values (More in Common).
  • East Asia. Researchers at Pew Research Center have reported that “the left-right construct is not applicable to each country,” and tested a progressive–conservative question instead in Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand (WAPOR 2025).

Where two-axis maps fall short

  • The axes depend on who draws them. Eysenck chose radicalism and tough-mindedness, Pournelle the state and planned progress, Nolan two kinds of freedom. Each choice sorts the same ideas differently.
  • Quizzes can tilt. A 2009 study simulated 500,000 versions of a voting-advice quiz and found that “the specific selection of statements has a considerable impact” on the advice it produced (West European Politics). Britannica notes that the Political Compass in particular has been “criticized as a tool for propagating libertarian ideas.” The site’s own answer to complaints of slanted questions: “Most of them are slanted! Some right-wingers accuse us of a leftward slant. Some left-wingers accuse us of a rightward slant” (FAQ).
  • The labels move. “Libertarian” was first used politically in 19th-century France for communist anarchists, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes. Hyrum and Verlan Lewis go further, arguing in The Myth of Left and Right that the positions grouped as left and right have shifted in “unpredictable and even contradictory ways.”
  • Two may not be enough, and some people have no fixed pattern. Pournelle himself said he was “certain there are other important ones.” And political scientists Donald Kinder and Nathan Kalmoe argue that “real liberals and real conservatives are found in impressive numbers only among those who are deeply engaged in political life” (Neither Liberal nor Conservative).

How We the Panel’s map works

We the Panel uses two axes too, and they are the same in every country: the economy, from shared responsibility to self-reliance, and society, from change to tradition. Three positions on each give nine types. A third scale, trust in the political system, can add a trait rather than a third axis.

We’ve tried to learn from the criticisms above. On each scale some statements lean left and some lean right, so agreeing with everything puts you in the middle, not on one side. If a statement makes no sense to you, you can say so and it’s left out instead of counted as neutral. Our free, nonpartisan quiz has 24 statements, the same everywhere, and the cut-offs are fixed and the same for everyone. Scoring the economy and society separately leaves room for people whose views on the two don’t line up. But where a country’s politics turns on something else, such as language, national identity or a long-running conflict, two axes will miss part of the picture, ours included. Our method page explains how it all works. The quiz never tells you how to vote, and it doesn’t match you to parties or candidates.

For what the surveys say about the people one line misses, see Liberal, conservative, or neither?

Sources

  1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Political spectrum (Stephen Eldridge) (updated August 2026).
  2. History.com, Where Did the Terms ‘Left Wing’ and ‘Right Wing’ Come From? (updated September 2025).
  3. Gresham College, The Psychology of Politics (Glenn D. Wilson, lecture) (December 2011).
  4. jerrypournelle.com, Jerry Pournelle’s essay on his political axes, reposted (March 2020).
  5. Reason, Dave Nolan, R.I.P. (Robert Poole) (November 2010).
  6. Advocates for Self-Government, About the quiz (accessed October 2026).
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  8. The Political Compass, Frequently Asked Questions (accessed October 2026).
  9. The New York Times, Online Diary (Pamela LiCalzi O’Connell) (December 2003).
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  11. Vox Pop Labs, Vote Compass methodology, version 2026.1 (June 2026).
  12. Cato Institute, An Alternative Analysis of Mass Belief Systems (Lilie and Maddox) (August 1981).
  13. Pew Research Center, In Search of Ideologues in America (Keeter and Smith) (April 2006).
  14. Public Opinion Quarterly, The Nature of Political Ideology in the Contemporary Electorate (Treier and Hillygus) (2009).
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  33. Chatham House, Belgian Federalism (Wilfried Swenden, conference paper) (April 2003).
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